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Does Justice Have a Syntax?
Steven L. Winter

I.
What would it mean to say that justice has a syntax? No doubt, proper syntax
and jargon-free English would enhance the clarity and comprehensibility
of legal statements and improve the administration of justice. But there is
no necessary relation between clarity and justice. True, a syntactical error
in a canonical legal command such as a statute can cause vagueness, create
ambiguity, or unjustly enlarge that law’s scope.1 So, too, a deliberate disregard
of syntax can lead to misinterpretation of a constitutional provision, as in District
of Columbia v. Heller,2 discussed below. But no one thinks that a syntactically
correct legal pronouncement is more likely to be just. Proper syntax does
not save “separate but equal.”3 Brown’s rejoinder that “[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal” is ethically, but not syntactically, superior.4
Only if proper syntax had some valence (whether political or conceptual), if
Steven L. Winter is Walter S. Gibbs Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Wayne State
University Law School. Copyright 2017; all rights reserved. Portions of this paper are adapted
from Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind (2001) and Steven L.
Winter, Frame Semantics and the ‘Internal Point of View,’ in 15 Current Legal Issues; Law and Language
115 (Michael Freeman & Fiona Smith eds., 2013).
This essay was originally delivered at a conference titled “The Syntax of Justice” supported by
the Journal of Legal Education and held at Northeastern University School of Law on March 30
and 31, 2017. The conference focused on contributions that the study of linguistics could make
to an understanding of law. Topics included plain language jury instructions and the oppressive
role that an official language plays in multi-lingual societies; the editors of the Journal of Legal
Education requested permission to include it here, even though plans to publish the other papers
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1.

See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (interpreting “receive[], possess[], or
transport[] in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm” to mean that in commerce
or affecting commerce applies to receive, possess and transport and not just transport);
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (interpreting “use a firearm” broadly to include
not the only clear use of shooting a firearm but other uses such as trading a firearm for
drugs).

2.

554 U.S. 570 (2008).

3.

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy, of course, did not actually use that phrase. But
see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“in the field of public education
the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”).

4.

Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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it had some practical implication for how one makes law, would a statement
about the syntax of justice make sense.
The question of justice’s syntax might, then, be figurative. If we take
syntax as the set of rules, principles, and processes that govern the structure of
sentences in a given language, then to say that justice has a syntax would be
to say that justice is a product of the correct application of rules, principles,
and processes to legal questions. But this is what Cardozo in The Nature of the
Judicial Process derides as “the demon of formalism” that “tempts the intellect
with the lure of scientific order.”5 Formalism can contribute to justice only if
the legal rules, principles, and processes fit the world in a comprehensive and
objective way. Otherwise, the law’s aspiration to treat like cases alike will fail.
In fact, this approach to law often produces injustice, as in the case of formal
equality. “[L]a majestueuse égalité des lois, qui interdit au riche comme au pauvre de coucher
sous les ponts….”6 (“In its majestic equality, the law forbids rich and poor alike to
sleep under the bridges”). To reduce justice to “a form of words” is, as Holmes
implies, to render it meaningless.7
“Syntax” is from the post-classical Latin syntaxis and the Greek σύνταξις
(súntaksis) meaning arrangement.8 Perhaps to say that justice has a syntax is
to claim that there is some organization of legal concepts that is more likely to
produce justice. This would be an interesting and ambitious claim. But what
would such an arrangement look like? Would it be hierarchical (as in legal
formalism), linear and binary (as is most standard legal reasoning), or would
it take some other, unspecified structure? It doesn’t matter in the end, because
a structure of concepts cannot assure justice any more than a syntactically
correct sentence can guarantee meaning.
It is, of course, easy to construct syntactically impeccable but semantically
anomalous sentences. (E.g., “The overweight newspaper ran thoughtfully.”)
But more importantly, a syntactically correct sentence can have more than one
meaning depending on its semantic frame of reference. Gilles Fauconnier and
Mark Turner give the example of a child on a beach playing in the sand with a
shovel.9 One might ask, variously: “Is the shovel safe?” “Is the child safe?” “Is
the beach safe?” Each of these statements inquires after the safety of the child.
But there is no fixed, one-dimensional property that the term “safe” assigns or
applies to the shovel, the child, and the beach. Each question inquires into a
different potential danger: The first question asks whether the child might be
5.

Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 66 (1921).

6.

Anatole France, Le Lys Rouge 118 (1894). The exact page and quotation is available
here: https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:Anatole_France_-_Le_Lys_rouge.djvu/118. The
English translation is The Red Lily, Complete, available here: https://www.gutenberg.org/
files/3922/3922-h/3922-h.htm (released 2006).

7.

Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).

8.

Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2014).

9.

Gilles Fauconnier & Mark Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the
Mind’s Hidden Complexities 25–26 (2002).
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harmed by the shovel; the second whether the child requires supervision; and
the third whether the beach is one marked by sudden, dramatic tides. In all
of these statements, the word “safe” prompts the addressee to invoke a danger
frame with abstract roles and relations such as agent, instrument, patient,
and consequent harm. But in each case, the addressee fills out those abstract
elements with different contextual components.
In the context of the first question, the sharp edge of the shovel is the agent
or instrument capable of inflicting harm on the child (the patient) by cutting it.
Even this could be reversed, however, in a different context. Thus, if the child
has gotten hold of an antique or ornamental shovel, one might turn to his or
her caretaker and ask, “Is the shovel safe?” One would also be invoking the
danger frame in this case. But it would be the child who is the potential agent
of harm and the fragile shovel the patient at risk of injury. In all these cases, we
see that the meaning is not in the words but in the minds of interpreters who
understand those words in light of the mental frames that are activated in the
particular situation.
II.
A significant part of human communication involves the telegraphing of
frames so that the audience is able to reconstruct the speaker’s intended meaning.
Consider the text of the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”10
Writing for the majority in Heller, Justice Scalia read the amendment as
protecting “an individual right unconnected with militia service” to possess
firearms for the purpose of self-defense.11 To reach this conclusion, he used a
two-part rhetorical strategy. First, he parsed the amendment into an operative
clause protecting “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” and a
prefatory clause explaining that a well-regulated militia is “necessary to the
security of a free State.”12 The latter, he declared, was merely a preamble with
no legal force; “a prefatory clause,” he explained, “does not limit or expand
the scope of the operative clause.”13 The point of this linguistic legerdemain
was to render the opening clause inert so the Court would be free to extend
the right to bear arms beyond its historical (and textually declared) context of
citizen militias to the modern context of private gun ownership in the home.14
10.

U.S. Const., amend. II.

11.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

12.

Id. at 577.

13.

Id. at 577–78. The argument followed Judge Silberman’s in Parker v. District of Columbia,
478 F.3d 370 (2007), and was suggested by previous scholarship. See Nelson Lund, The Past
and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 Georgia L. Rev. 1, 2, 22–26 (1996); Eugene Volokh,
The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 793, 802–04, 807 (1998). See also Nelson
Lund, D.C.’s Handgun Ban and the Constitutional Right to Arms: One Hard Question?, 18 Geo. Mason
U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 229, 237 (2008).

14.

Thus, although Justice Scalia conceded “that self-defense had little to do with the right’s
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Second, Justice Scalia insisted that the natural import of the “operative
clause” was plain: Thus, “to keep and bear arms” means, simply, “to have and
carry weapons.”15 The problem with this wooden literalism is that “to bear
arms” is a familiar idiom connoting service in the military.16 An amicus brief
before the Court argued:
In every instance we have found where the term “bear arms” (or “bearing
arms” or “bear arms against”) is employed, without any additional modifying
language attached, the term unquestionably is used in its idiomatic military
sense. It is only where additional language is tacked on, either to bend the
idiom by specifying a particular type of fighting or to break the idiom by
adding incompatible language, that the meaning of “bear arms” deviates.17

Although there is (as we shall see) some truth to the point about modifiers,
the claim about “every instance” is overstated.18 Not content to dispute the
claim with evidence, however, Justice Scalia responded with a categorical
overstatement of his own. The phrase “to bear arms,” he insisted, “unequivocally
bore that idiomatic meaning only when followed by the preposition ‘against.’”19
This assertion is simply false. Indeed, just two weeks earlier in his dissent in
Boumediene v. Bush, Justice Scalia had decried the Court’s “disastrous” decision
with the observation that in the prior week “13 of our countrymen in arms were
killed” in Afghanistan and Iraq.20 Moreover, the use of “arms” to connote
military service—with or without “to bear” and with or without “against”—
is systematic in ordinary English (and other related languages). Consider
the phrases: “To arms!” (Civil War recruitment poster); “A call to arms”
(same); “to take up arms”; “to lay down one’s arms”; “A Farewell to Arms”
(Hemingway novel); “brothers in arms”; General Patton’s statement that “the
highest obligation and privilege of citizenship is that of bearing arms for one’s
codification,” he nevertheless insisted that self-defense “was the central component of the right
itself.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 (emphasis in original).
15.

Id. at 581–93.

16.

An idiom, by definition, is “a group of words established by usage as having a meaning not
deducible from those of the individual words.” Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2010)
(definition 3).

17.

Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E. Baron, Ph.D., Richard W. Bailey,
Ph.D. and Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Ph.D. in Support of Petitioners at 4, District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290) (hereinafter Linguists’ Brief).

18.

The claim is disputed with counterexamples both by Justice Scalia in Heller, 554 U.S. at
584–92, and by other scholars. See Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, What Did
“Bear Arms Mean” in the Second Amendment? 6 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 511 (2008). Although many
of the nonmilitary usages documented by Cramer and Olson and referred to by the Court
are subject to modifiers such as “bear arms for their own defense,” not all are.

19.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 586 (emphasis in original).

20.

553 U.S. 723, 827 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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country”;21 and the iconic crescendo of La Marseillaise, “Aux armes, citoyens!/ Formez
vos bataillons/ Marchons, marchons!” (“To arms, citizens!/ Form your battalions/
Let’s march, let’s march!”). Replacing the word “arms” with “weapons” in
any of these phrases would either render them unintelligible (e.g., “brothers
in weapons”) or awkward (e.g., “a call to weapons”). The sole exception is
the phrase “to lay down one’s arms,” which works equally well whether we
substitute the word “weapons” or “guns.” But even in that case, the obvious
meaning is the idiomatic one of ceasing armed conflict, as in the antiwar novel
that won its author the Nobel Peace Prize in 1905, Lay Down Your Arms!22
The linguists’ point about the effect of modifiers as bending or “breaking”
the idiom is almost correct.23 It is a familiar aspect of ordinary language that
modifiers mark off the edges of or extensions from the default assumptions
that define the central case. Thus, there is “dry ice,” but there is no such idiom
as “wet ice.” Perhaps the example best known to lawyers is Chief Justice
Marshall’s discussion in McCulloch of the ordinary-language meaning of the
word “necessary.”
The word “necessary” . . . has not a fixed character peculiar to itself. It admits
of all degrees of comparison, and is often connected with other words which
increase or diminish the impression the mind receives of the urgency it
imports. A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably
necessary.24

Marshall used the existence of such modifiers denoting strict necessity to
corroborate his conclusion that, in its ordinary usage, the word necessary
“frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or
essential to another.”25 Other examples would be the various modifiers we
use to identify parents as “working mothers,” “stay-at-home dads,” “surrogate
mothers,” “biological fathers,” “gestational mothers,” etc. Each assumes
some divergence from the stereotypical case of a natural parent who is also a
primary caretaker and nurturer.26 In the same way, the use of a modifier such as
21.

General George S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It 335 (1947).

22.

Bertha von Sutter, Lay Down Your Arms (2015) (originally published in German in 1889
as Die Waffen nieder!).

23.

Linguists’ Brief, supra note 17, at 21 (“It is only in usages where additional specifying language
is added, such as ‘bear arms for the defence of themselves and their own state, or the United
States, or for the purpose of killing game,’ that any intent to bend, even change (in the case
of killing game), the idiom is apparent.”).

24.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 414 (1819).

25.

Id. at 413. For a parallel analysis for the term “rule,” see Steven L. Winter, Clearing in the
Forest: Law, Life, and Mind 206-07 (2001).

26.

George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About
the Mind 76–83 (1987); Winter, Clearing in the Forest, supra note 25, at 89–92. Now that
most women work outside the home the term “stay-at-home mom” has replaced “working
mother” as the marker of divergence from the expected norm. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Employment Characteristics of Families—2019 (April 21, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
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“bear arms . . . for the purpose of killing game” corroborates that the military
meaning is the default sense of “bear arms.” Thus, one can “bear arms for
self-defense” or “for the purpose of killing game,” but it would be awkward
(because redundant) to say that someone had been called upon “to bear arms
for the purpose of serving in the military.”
Because Justice Scalia’s literalism committed him to a single, distinctive,
“plain” meaning for each word,27 he rejected the argument about modifiers: “A
purposive qualifying phrase that contradicts the word or phrase it modifies is
unknown this side of the looking glass (except, apparently, in some courses on
Linguistics).”28 But, this statement, too, is simply false. Consider such familiar
idioms as:
• rolling stop
• open secret
• deafening silence
• grim joke
• black humor
• restless sleep
• silent scream
In each of these cases, the modifier identifies a variant of the central case
connoted by the noun. Thus, an open secret is something that would ordinarily
be kept private, is widely known, but is either not spoken of or spoken about
only confidentially and off the record. Similarly, the term “deafening silence”
connotes that the absence of an expected response forcefully signifies rejection
or disapproval (as in “the boss’s suggestion was met with a deafening silence”).
Consider, too, some literary examples (the first two of which long predate the
Second Amendment).
• “sweet sorrow” 29
• “modest pride” 30
• “warm, scalding coolness” 31
• “terrible beauty”32
pdf/famee.pdf.
27.

For a particularly amusing example, see footnote 7 in Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732–36 (2006) (distinguishing among a ditch, a moat,
a canal, a channel, and a stream).

28.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 589.

29.

William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet act 2, Sc. 2.

30.

John Milton, Paradise Lost 4.320.

31.

Ernest Hemingway, For Whom the Bell Tolls 73 (1940).

32.

William Butler Yeats, Easter, 1916 in W.B. Yeats, Michael Robartes and the Dancer: Manuscript
Materials 69 (Thomas Parkinson & Anne Brannen eds. 1994) (originally published in 1921).
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In all these examples, the author juxtaposes otherwise contradictory concepts
to convey a nuanced or layered emotional response. Thus, the horrific events
of the Irish republican rebellion of 1916 are “changed, changed utterly” by
Yeats into a heroic martyrdom—i.e., a terrible beauty—recognized “Wherever
green is worn.”33 Similarly, Milton presents Eve’s coy submission to Adam as
reflecting both an outer show of virtue and an inner thrill at being desired.34
But each of these literary examples—like each of the idioms in the first group—
trades on the default sense of the underlying terms to convey its particular
meaning. Indeed, these turns of phrase would not work unless the reader
shared those default understandings.
To say that the default sense of “to bear arms” refers to military service is
not to say the term cannot be used to signify “carry weapons.” (On this point,
it was the linguists who were simply wrong.) Which meaning it bears depends
on historical and linguistic context.35 But that only raises the question: What is
the historical and linguistic context of the Second Amendment?
On its face, the amendment focuses on the connection between a citizen
militia and the success of popular self-government—a relation that, as J.G.A.
Pocock points out, is expressed “in language directly descended” from
Machiavelli.36 In Heller, Justice Scalia relied heavily on the history of the
seventeenth-century English Bill of Rights, which repudiated the practice
of the Stuarts who, having disarmed the Protestant militias, used select
33.

Id. at 75. The poem commemorates the failed Irish uprising of April 24-30, 1916, in which 485
people were killed, 2600 wounded, 3500 taken prisoner, and fifteen of the leaders executed
after conviction in secret courts martial.

34.

In a different context, “modest pride” might connote—as with “rolling stop”—a graduated
amount of pride. Thus, an amateur carpenter might point to his or her project with “modest
pride.” In contrast, an expert carpenter who said “that came out tolerably well” would be
speaking with modest pride in the same coy sense as Milton’s Eve.

35.

An 1807 letter from William Hull, governor of the Michigan Territory, to British authorities
in Canada concerning the first official company of African American militia uses the term
“Arms” in both senses. When African American militiamen were seen in military drill by
British officers across the river, Governor Hull wrote:
The permission which I have given to a small number of Negroes, occasionally to
exercise in Arms…I am informed has excited some sensibility among the Inhabitants
of the British shore. Be assured Sir, it is without any foundation, for they only have
the use of their Arms, while exercising, and at all other times they are deposited in a
situation out of their control.
Letter of Gov. William Hull to Lt. Colonel Jaspar Grant, September 3, 1807, quoted in Tiya
Miles, The Dawn of Detroit: A Chronicle of Slavery and Freedom in the City of
the Straits 192–96 (2017). The reference to “exercise in Arms” is to formal military drill as
militiamen; in the second reference, “Arms” connotes simply weapons (though, to be sure,
the weapons they used as militiamen).

36.

J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the
Atlantic Republican Tradition 528 (1975). Interestingly, but unsurprisingly, none of the
articles or opinions supporting a broad reading of the Second Amendment even mentions
Machiavelli or the militia tradition in civic republican thought that he originated.
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Catholic militias to suppress their enemies.37 On this view, an armed citizenry
presumedly acts as a check on central power and, thus, preserves liberty.38 But
this understanding presents three difficulties. First, it is at odds with the text
of the amendment, which emphasizes “the security of a free State” and not the
liberty of its individual citizens. Second, an interpretation of the amendment
that is premised on the particular events in England following the Restoration
obviously owes little to Machiavelli, who lived more than a century and a
half earlier. Third, this understanding fails to explain the specific connection
between “the security of a free State” and a “well regulated Militia.”39
In The Prince, Machiavelli argued for the pragmatic superiority of a militia
of native troops over either mercenaries (known, in his day, as condottieri)
or the troops of allies (whom he refers to as auxiliaries).40 In The Art of War,
Machiavelli argued that a militia of citizen soldiers can “be used in times of
peace for training and in times of war for necessity and for glory, . . . and any
city governed otherwise is not well ordered.”41 Machiavelli’s key innovation
was his insistence on the relation between the training of the militia and a
well-ordered city. The argument, Pocock explains, was that military virtue
produces political virtue because the republic is in both cases the common
good and, conversely, that it is “through military discipline that one learned
to be a citizen and to display civic virtue.”42 Far from precatory, the opening
clause of the amendment draws an explicit connection between “the security
of a free State” and a “well regulated Militia.” It is not just that a militia must
be well trained to be effective in battle, but that a well-regulated militia will
produce self-disciplined citizens. In the words of Machiavelli’s seventeenthcentury successor, James Harrington: “‘Give us good men and they will make
us good laws’ is the maxim of a demagogue . . . . But ‘give us good orders, and
they will make us good men’ is the maxim of a legislator and the most infallible
37.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 593.

38.

There were, certainly, those who argued that an armed militia would serve as a check on
tyranny. Patrick Henry’s “great objection to this Government” was “that it does not leave
us the means of defending our rights; or, of waging war against tyrants . . . .” Herbert
J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For: The Political Thought of the
Opponents of the Constitution 35 (1981). See also Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second
Amendment, 99 Yale L. J. 637, 648 (1989) (suggesting that “the ultimate ‘checking value’ in a
republican polity is the ability of an armed populace, presumptively motivated by a shared
commitment to the common good, to resist governmental tyranny”).

39.

Scalia’s majority opinion gave scant attention to this clause, noting (tautologically) that “the
adjective ‘well-regulated’ implies nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline and
training.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 597.

40.

Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince 47–49 (Luigi Ricci trans. 1903). Modern professional
armies emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century. By the close of the War of 1812,
the efficacy of the militia was largely discredited—though not necessarily the myth. Sean
Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln 164 (2005).

41.

Niccolò Machiavelli, Art of War I: 75-76, at 16 (Christopher Lynch trans. & ed., 2003).

42.

Pocock, supra note 36, at 201.
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in the politics.”43 The object was not liberty as in independence from a strong
central power, but security in the Machiavellian sense that “the foundation of
all states is a good… [militia], and that where this does not exist there can be
neither good laws nor any other good thing….”44
Machiavelli’s republican conception of a citizen militia was the source of
the Whig opposition to a standing army—a controversy that raged in England
in the so-called “paper war” of 1697-1699 and which, though unnoted in
Heller, directly influenced the adoption of the Second Amendment.45 This
civic republican militia tradition is reflected as well in several European
constitutions; in particular, the Swiss Constitution provides: “In principle, the
armed forces shall be organised as a militia.”46
43.

James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics 64 (J.G.A.
Pocock ed. 1992). As he later notes: “Good orders make evil men good, and bad orders make
good men evil.” Id. at 274. Harrington was an important influence on the Framers of the
U.S. Constitution, especially Adams. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the
American Revolution 34, 45 (1967); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic, 1776-1787, at 48–49 (2d ed. 1998). Harrington is the source of the familiar phrase “a
government of laws and not of men.” Harrington, supra, at 35. See also Frank I. Michelman,
The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 4 n.2 (1986).

44.

Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy bk. III, ch. 31, ¶ 4, at 283 (Harvey C. Mansfield
& Nathan Tarcov eds., 2009); see also The Prince, supra note 40, at 47 (“The chief foundations
of all states . . . are good laws and good arms. And as there cannot be good laws where there
are not good arms, and where there are good arms there should be good laws . . . .”). The
term used in Mansfield’s translation of the passage from the Discourses quoted in the text
is “military,” but in the original Italian the word used is milizia and not militari. Tutte Le
Opere di Niccolò Machiavelli 413 (Francesco Flora & Carlo Cordie eds., 1949). Philip
Bobbitt reads Machiavelli to argue that good arms make good laws because the state has
the power to enforce order on inherently recalcitrant subjects. Phillip Bobbitt, Garments
of Court and Palace: Machiavelli and the World that He Made 69-70 (2013) (quoting
Discourses, supra, at bk. I, ch. 3, ¶ 1, at 15). But Machiavelli’s argument is, rather, that: (1)
good arms make good laws because good arms (that is, effective military forces) require good
discipline; (2) good discipline yields good character because in the military citizens learn
both the discipline of self-restraint and the capacity or disposition to sacrifice themselves for
the greater good; and (3) citizens of good character will make good laws in the sense that,
as Bobbitt himself says, “good laws are those that effectively serve the common good.” Id. at
69.

45.

See Pocock, supra note 35, at 426–32, 528; Lois G. Schwoerer, The Literature of the Standing Army
Controversy, 1697–1699, 28 Huntington Lib. Q. 187 (1965). This literature was widely available
and influential in the colonies during the Revolution and the framing period. Id. at 210–11;
Bailyn, supra note 42, at 43–45, 61–63, 112–16. Cf. Pocock, supra note 36, at 597 (“The Whig
canon and the neo-Harringtonians . . . formed the authoritative literature of this [colonial]
culture . . . and accounts for the singular cultural and intellectual homogeneity of the
Founding Fathers and their generation.”).

46.

Bundesverfassung [BV] [Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 58, para. 1 (Switz.),
translated in 101 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, Fed. Council, https://www.admin.
ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html#a58 (Jan. 1, 2020). Universal
military service is also required by the constitutions of Austria, Denmark, Finland, and The
Netherlands. Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution] BGBl No. 1/1930, as last
amended by Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBl I No. 102/2014, art. 9a, ¶ 3, https://
www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1930_1/ERV_1930_1.pdf (Austria) (translation
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All of this history, of course, is lost in the Heller majority’s deliberately
wooden reading of the Second Amendment.
A frame semantics approach, in contrast, brings the language and the history
together. To see the point, suppose I said to you, “We’re having some people
over tonight and we would appreciate if you could bring an extra chair.” You
have rocking chair, a beanbag chair, and a particularly decrepit-looking but
still functional folding chair. Which do you bring? The answer is that you
do not know; it depends on the purpose of the gathering. If we are hosting a
dinner party, the rocking and beanbag chairs will not do. But if we are having a
discussion group such as a book club, you would definitely choose the rocking
or beanbag chair over the folding chair. Suppose, instead, that I said to you, “A
comfortable audience being necessary to success of a good book club, please
bring a chair tonight.” In that event, awkward sentence structure aside, you
would know precisely what kind of chair to bring because the prefatory clause
had told you exactly which frame to invoke. In other words, the meaning of a
clause such as “the right to keep and bear arms” is not a transparent, contextindependent statement deducible from the bare words of the text. The words
alone do not tell us what kind of guns for what kind of purposes under what
kind of conditions are meant to be included. Rather, the meaning of the clause
is frame-dependent and can be inferred only through a more complex process
of reconstruction—albeit one that, here, is telegraphed by the opening clause
of the constitutional provision.
Meaning is not mechanical: It does not follow from the literal denotation
of a word nor from the proper ordering of concepts. Syntax can be an aid to
meaning, but it cannot substitute for it. Meaning is a function of the frames
of reference that provide substance to the words we use. Or, to put it more
precisely, meaning is not in the words but in the mind.
III.
In The Nature of the Judicial Process, Cardozo juxtaposes logic or “the method of
philosophy” with “a mere sentiment of justice.”47 But justice is not an emotion;
it is a sense that arises from our everyday processes of meaning-making.
Semantic meaning, as we have seen in the cases of “safe” and “bear arms,”
involves complex processes of intelligibility that draw on tacit knowledge of
the relevant domain, including context, purpose, social understandings and
included); Constitutional Act (Den.), Sec. 81 (June 5, 1953), translated in My Constitutional
Act, Folktinget, https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/-/media/pdf/publikationer/english/
my_constitutional_act_with_explanations.ashx; Suomen Perustuslaki, 12 Luku, § 127
(Fin.), translated in The Constitution of Finland, Ministry of Justice, https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/
kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf; Statuut Ned [Charter] art. 98, translated at Netherlands’s
Constitution of 1814 with Amendments through 2008, Constitute, https://www.constituteproject.
org/constitution/Netherlands_2008.pdf?lang=en. Second Amendment enthusiasts often
point out that Swiss recruits keep their rifles at home. Since 2007, however, Swiss recruits
are issued rifles but not ammunition. S.R. 514.101, Art. 1 & 7.
47.

Cardozo, supra note 5, at 44.
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assumptions, models of behavior, etc. These cognitive and cultural models
embody norms of behavior that form our sense of justice in the situation.48
The law of perjury provides an instructive context in which to examine
the relationship between justice and semantics. The federal statute, § 1621,
provides: “Whoever…having taken an oath before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person . . . willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any
material matter which he does not believe to be true…is guilty of perjury.”49 In
Bronston v. United States,50 the Supreme Court held that the statute is not violated
“so long as the witness speaks the literal truth.”51
Bronston was the sole proprietor of a business seeking relief from its
creditors under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. During that proceeding,
counsel for one of the creditors asked Bronston whether he had any accounts
in Swiss banks. Bronston responded that he did not. The lawyer then asked if
he had ever had any such accounts, to which Bronston replied: “The company
had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.”52 In fact, Bronston
also had a personal bank account in Geneva for five years during which he
deposited and withdrew more than $180,000. At Bronston’s subsequent
perjury trial, the judge instructed the jury that the issue was whether Bronston
“spoke his true belief,” that he could not be convicted if he merely failed to
understand the question, and that his answer should be “considered in the
context in which it was given.”53 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction,
reasoning that Bronston had committed perjury because he had intentionally
given “an answer containing half of the truth . . . in place of the responsive
answer called for by a proper question” and that this “constitutes a lie by
negative implication.”54
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. The Court acknowledged that there
“is, indeed, an implication in the answer to the second question that there
was never a personal bank account; in casual conversation this interpretation
might reasonably be drawn.”55 It nevertheless concluded that Bronston had
not violated the statute because his statement was literally true—that is, the
company had had a Swiss account. The Court rejected the jury’s finding that
Bronston had intended to mislead, arguing that the witness’s state of mind is
48.

On the close conceptual connection between the frame semantic or cognitive model view
adumbrated here and Karl Llewellyn’s notion of “situation sense,” see Winter, Clearing in
the Forest, supra note 25, at 216–22.

49.

18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2018).

50.

409 U.S. 352 (1973).

51.

Id. at 360. For an explanation of the Court’s conclusion in terms of prototype effects, see
Winter, Clearing, supra note 25, at 303-08.

52.

Bronston, 409 U.S. at 354.

53.

Id. at 355.

54.

Id. at 356 (quoting 453 F.2d 555, 559 (2d Cir. 1972)).

55.

Id. at 357.
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“relevant only to the extent that it bears on whether ‘he does not believe (his
answer) to be true.’”56
Bronston is, in many ways, a curious decision.57 First, the Court purported
to read the statute “literally,” insisting that “the statute does not make it a
criminal act for a witness to willfully state any material matter that implies any
material matter that he does not believe to be true.”58 Yet the Court’s own
conclusion—that the statute does not apply “so long as the witness speaks the
literal truth”—is no less a departure from the statutory language.59 In plain
terms, § 1621 makes falsity of belief, not factual falsity, the gravamen of the
offense.
Perhaps the Court thought that, when one states an insufficient but “literal”
truth, one believes one’s own ruse. Neither the jury nor the courts below
thought so; indeed, an ordinary person might be forgiven for assuming that
testimony intended to deceive the tribunal fell within the prohibition of saying
something one “does not believe to be true.” To put the point differently, an
ordinary person might reasonably have thought that § 1621 prohibits lying to
a court.
Perhaps the Court thought that, in insisting on factual falsity, it was reading
the statute to prohibit lying. But, in making factual falsity the sine qua non of the
offense, the Court got it exactly backward. In empirical work, Linda Coleman
and Paul Kay found that, although people typically define a lie as a false
statement, factual falsity is the least important of the three criteria that people
actually use to identify statements as lies.60 Rather, a “consistent pattern was
found: falsity of belief is the most important element in the prototype of
lie, intended deception the next most important element, and factual falsity
the least important.”61 The perjury statute reflects exactly this shared social
56.

Id. at 359.

57.

The Court put the burden on trial counsel to guard against deception by proper crossexamination: “If a witness evades, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to recognize the evasion
and to bring the witness back to the mark.” Id. at 358-59. When the perjury charge arises
from a criminal case or grand jury testimony where the government is a party, that argument
makes some sense. But Bronston was a bankruptcy proceeding; the government was not a
party and could act only after the fact to punish a fraud on its courts.

58.

Id. at 357–58 (emphasis in original).

59.

Id. at 360.

60.

Linda Coleman & Paul Kay, Prototype Semantics: The English Verb Lie, 57 Language 26, 43 (1981).
Cole replicated the Coleman and Kay study for Makkan Arabic, finding only minor religious
and cultural differences. Shirley A.N. Cole, Semantic Prototypes and the Pragmatics of Lie Across
Cultures, 23 LACUS Forum 475 (1996). Hardin confirmed the Coleman and Kay findings
for Ecuadorian Spanish, though she found that different cultural norms of friendliness
supported a somewhat broader scope for social lies. Karol J. Hardin, The Spanish Notion of Lie:
Revisiting Coleman and Kay, 42 J. Pragmatics 3199 (2010). See also Jörg Meibauer, Lying and Falsely
Implicating, 37 J. Pragmatics 1373, 1396 (2005) (arguing that falsely implicating should be
included within a general definition of lying, and that this would correspond with ordinary
usage as found by Coleman and Kay).

61.

Coleman & Kay, Prototype Semantics, supra note 60, at 43 (emphasis in original).

212

Journal of Legal Education

understandings of what constitutes a “lie.” It focuses on falsity of belief—just
as ordinary people do.
Second, the Court was curiously inconsistent in its reasoning. The trial court
had instructed the jury that an answer could be deliberately misleading even
if technically true; it gave the example of a person who testifies that he entered
a store five times when he actually entered it fifty times. The Court rejected
that analysis: “[I]t is doubtful that an answer which, in response to a specific
quantitative inquiry, baldly understates a numerical fact can be described as
even ‘technically true.’”62 But it is difficult to see how the Court could square
this statement with its reasoning in Bronston. On one hand, an answer that
deliberately understates an amount is still literally true: The witness did go into
the store five times. If it seems otherwise, it is only because in context the smaller
number (five instead of fifty) is deliberately misleading. On the other hand,
one could just as well say that Bronston understated a numerical fact: He was
asked whether he ever had any Swiss accounts; he replied that the company
had one when, in fact, he had two Swiss accounts—one for the company and
one for himself.
Third, Bronston is deliberately tone-deaf to how actual humans communicate.63
In ordinary conversation, people make statements by implication and are
readily understood as having done so. Consider the exchange: “How did you
two manage to get away for an entire weekend?” “My Mom’s in town.” If we
took the answer at face value, it would be a non sequitur. We don’t apprehend
it that way because we automatically infer the contextual information that
gives sense to the reply—that the addressee has children (or some similar
responsibility); that his or her mom has agreed to serve as babysitter (or
caretaker); and that, because Mom was available to fill in, the couple were
able to have a weekend to themselves.
In a famous paper,64 H.P. Grice identified the general features of discourse
that enable such inferences. The basic idea he called the cooperative principle:
“Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange
in which you are engaged.”65 From this he specified four subcategories or
corollaries, the maxims of: (1) quantity—make your contribution as informative
as is required for current purposes, but not more informative than required;
(2) quality—do not say something you believe to be false or for which you lack
adequate evidence; (3) relation—be relevant; and (4) manner—be clear, brief, and
orderly.66 Thus, in our hypothetical exchange, the questioner understands
62.

Bronston, 409 U.S. at 355 n.3.

63.

Id. at 357 and supra text accompanying note 51.

64.

H.P Grice, Logic and Conversation, in Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts 41 (P. Cole & J.
Morgan eds. 1975). This paper was originally given as part of the William James Lectures at
Harvard in 1967.

65.

Id. at 45.

66.

Id. at 45–46. Note the conversational pathologies that typify violation of one or more of these
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the interlocutor to be responding to the question (maxim of relation) in the
simplest, most straightforward way (maxim of manner) by answering in the
most parsimonious fashion (maxim of quantity)—i.e., “we have a babysitter.”
Grice calls this a “conversational implicature.”67
In a case such as Bronston, the reply to the question “have you ever had
any Swiss bank accounts?” is expected to be responsive (maxim of relation),
honest (maxim of quality), and sufficient (maxim of quantity). When Bronston
says “the company had one,” he knows that the listener will be misled into
concluding that he maintained no other Swiss account. As Eve Sweetser
explains, the “overt statement and the false statement are linked by Gricean
conversational implicature; the utterance is irrelevant or insufficient in context,
unless the hearer also assumes the unspoken falsehood.”68 As the Court in
Bronston conceded, “only this unspoken denial would provide a logical nexus
between inquiry directed to petitioner’s personal account and petitioner’s
adverting, in response, to the company account in Zurich.”69 Thus, the verbal
part of the statement might be true, but the intended meaning of the statement
is false. The implicature is not “in” the words, but is carried “by the saying of
what is said, or by ‘putting it that way.’”70
The statute defines perjury as a willful statement on a material matter that
the witness does not believe to be true. The Court treated the term “statement”
reductively as referring to the literal words spoken. But the intended statement—
which Bronston did not believe—was the combination of the words spoken
and the meaning (that is, the implicature) that they carried. In other areas,
the law is more realistic in identifying statements. Rule 801(a) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence defines “statement” to include “nonverbal conduct, if the
person intended it as an assertion.”71 The Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination extends to the act of producing documents in
response to a subpoena when that act of production has “communicative”
or “testimonial aspects”—e.g., when it would constitute an admission that the
documents exist, that they are in the person’s possession, or that he or she
maxims. If you say too much (maxim of quantity), I may grow impatient, think you careless
of my time, or infer that you think me stupid. If I say something I don’t believe (maxim of
quality), you will conclude that I am lying or trying to deceive you. If you respond with an
irrelevance or at great length (maxims of relation and manner), I may think that you don’t
respect me. You will conclude the same if I ignore you altogether (cooperative principle).
67.

Id. at 45. By this Grice means that the implicature is not a conventional one, but arises from
the context of the conversation.

68.

Eve E. Sweetser, The Definition of Lie: An Examination of the Folk Models Underlying a Semantic Prototype,
in Cultural Models in Language and Thought 43, 60 (Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn
eds. 1987).
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Bronston, 409 U.S. at 361 n.5.

70.

Grice, supra note 64, at 58.

71.

See Peter Meijes Tiersma, The Language of Perjury “Literal Truth,” Ambiguity, and the False Statement
Requirement, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 373, 409-19 (1990).
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was aware of their contents.72 Under the False Statements Act governing the
submission of information to the government, the failure to fill in a blank space
on a form requiring disclosure of information (such as income or employment)
has been held to constitute a “false statement.”73 So, too, the answer “N/A”
(not applicable) on an immigration form has been held to violate federal law.74
If it seems odd to characterize an implied falsehood or an act such as leaving
a question blank as a “statement,” consider the idiom “deafening silence.” In
such a case, there is no statement at all; yet, we take the lack of a statement
when one is called for (maxim of relation) as speaking volumes (maxim of
quantity). So, too, an implicature is a silent statement carried by the overt
statement. In fact, the Court characterized Bronston’s testimony in just this
way: It specifically noted that it would be reasonable for the questioner to
conclude “that the unresponsive answer is given only because it is intended
to make a statement—a negative statement—relevant to the question asked.”75
Thus, a better reading of the statute would simply incorporate our everyday
understanding of what it means to state something (in this case, something
one does not believe to be true). Witnesses and jurors, after all, are people too;
they do not leave their ordinary linguistic competence behind when they enter
the courtroom.
And that competence is surprisingly sophisticated and robust. “Lie” has a
complex semantics that provides ordinary-language users with a highly nuanced
set of tools for assessing the ethics of a wide range of speech acts. Eve Sweetser
used a version of frame semantics and Gricean pragmatics to elaborate on the
Coleman and Kay findings.76 The concept “lie,” she explained, is understood
relative to two models that reflect our default expectations concerning
conversation and knowledge. The first assumes that conversation normally
involves an intention to be helpful—i.e., Grice’s cooperative principle. The
second recognizes that most of what we “know” is a matter of having adequate
reasons for belief rather than firsthand knowledge.
A “lie” is a statement that violates the social expectations and understandings
reflected in these models. Ordinarily, one is helpful if one conveys truthful
information. Because most of our knowledge is based on adequate reasons for
belief, the central criterion that identifies a statement as a “lie” is that the speaker
72.

United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984).

73.

The False Statements Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (2018). For judicial
interpretations see, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1017 (3d Cir. 1987); United
States v. Mattox, 689 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1982); Tiersma, supra note 71, at 409-12.
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United States v. Mensah, 737 F.3d 789, 804-05 (1st Cir. 2013) (answering N/A to question
whether the applicant had submitted an immigration application under any other name
constituted a material false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) (2012)).
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Bronston, 409 U.S. at 361 n.5 (emphasis added).
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Sweetser, supra note 68, at 43. Sweetser’s account is further developed in Lakoff, supra note
26, at 71–74, and Winter, Clearing in the Forest, supra note 25, at 297–300 (mapping the
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did not believe his or her own statement. Falsity of belief, moreover, entails a
breach of the fundamental normative assumption of intention to be helpful.
Coleman and Kay’s finding that intention to deceive was more important than
factual falsity in identifying a statement as a “lie” follows for the same reason:
It is intention to deceive that entails a breach of the fundamental normative
assumption of intention to be helpful.77 Factual falsity is adventitious; it may
be entailed in falsity of belief or intent to deceive, or it may not. Thus, if I
mistakenly insist that President Obama is right-handed, I will have given you
false information. But I will not have lied to you. Conversely, if I feed you a
stock tip I know to be false and you nevertheless profit on the investment, you
would be right to consider me a liar and not solicit my advice in the future.
Because our everyday concept of a “lie” is understood in relation to our
default social assumptions about conversation, it is context-sensitive in a way
that the Court’s truth-conditional definition—in which a “lie” is simply a false
statement—could never be. In fact, ordinary spoken English has a detailed
vocabulary that distinguishes among a broad array of false statements:
There are “social lies,” “white lies,” “fibs,” “fantasies,” “fiction,” “jokes,” “tall
tales,” “exaggerations,” “oversimplifications,” and “mistakes.” Each of these
expressions reflects a different social frame of reference for the evaluation of a
false statement.
Terms such as “joke,” “tall tale,” and “fiction” indicate that the informational
condition of the model of conversation is not operative. In these cases, the
speaker and listener are operating within a frame that assumes other purposes
for the communication such as humor or entertainment. Similarly, the term
“social lie”—e.g., telling the host it was a lovely party when, in fact, it was a not—
assumes a frame of communication in which politeness is more helpful than
information. “White lie” and “fib” assume a frame in which the informational
condition is generally applicable, but where the information being conveyed
is of no particular importance. Terms such as “fantasy,” “exaggeration,” and
“mistake” (as well as the hedge “for all I know”) assume that the model of
knowledge has been suspended. The speaker’s belief may be deluded,
overblown, or simply mistaken; in any event, the listener does not depend on
it for “truth.” A term like “oversimplification,” or a hedge like “to the best of
my knowledge,” assumes that the model of knowledge is operative but that the
acceptable “truth” conditions have been altered as specified.
In contrast to the Court’s wooden approach to perjury, our everyday
social understanding of what constitutes a “lie” represents a highly nuanced
set of widely shared normative judgments. Thus, Coleman and Kay found
that “subjects fairly easily and reliably assign the word lie to reported speech
acts in a more-or-less, rather than an all-or-none fashion” and that they “agree
fairly generally on the relative weights of the elements.”78 The complex
77.

Cf. William Blake, Auguries of Innocence, Lines 53–54: “A Truth that’s told with bad intent/
Beats all the Lies you can invent.” The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake 491
(David V. Erdman, ed. 1982).
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semantics of “lie” enables ordinary-language users to make context-sensitive
discriminations between merely false and deceptive (even if literally true)
statements. The Court’s technical line of factual falsity not only bleaches out
these subtle judgments, but leaves far too much room for the Holmesian “bad
man” to mislead judges and juries.79
Which is to say that justice may not have a syntax, but it does have a
semantics. It arises from the everyday processes of meaning-making that
depend on our situated, cultural knowledge of the norms of behavior that
underlie any particular area of social life. Ordinary linguistic competence
already embodies a semantics of justice. It is just that, sometimes, the law
honors it in the breach.

79.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897) (“If you
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